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M ECENT CASES
Workmen's Compensation Act-Immunity of Third Party Employer. D, a foreign
corporation engaged in manufacturing chemicals, sold to X scrap iron including a coil
of pipe which D had used in its business. P, an employee of a salvage dealer, was
ordered by his employer to pick up the scrap iron at X's yard. In order to place the
coil of pipe in proper position on his truck, P struck the pipe with a maul, the force
of the blow causing a corrosive substance to issue from the pipe and injure P. Instead
of taking compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, P elected to sue the
tortfeasor. Judgment for P in Trial Court Appeal. Held: Affirmed. D is not within
the immunity provision of R m. Rav. STAT. § 7675 [P.P.C. § 709-1] since, though P's
injury was connected with D's extrahazardous employment, the connection is remote
and not "temporal." Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co. of Wash. v. Haynes, 184 F. 2d 355
(9th Cir., 1950).
The history of workmen's compensation in Washington dates from 1911 when the
legislature, realizing that the unfortunate conditions then existing called for remedial
action, passed the first act. Wash. Laws, 1911, c. 74, p. 345. It was designed to furnish
a remedy which would reach every injury sustained by a workman in any of those
industries said to be of an extrahazardous nature. State ex. rel. Davis-Smith Co. v.
Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911). The original act provided that each
workman injured, whether at the employer's plant, he being in the course of
his employment, away from the plant, was entitled to compensation. Also, ". . . if the
injury to a workman occurring away from the plant of his employer is due to the
negligence of another not in the same employ, the injured workman (or his bene-
ficiaries or dependents) shall elect whether to take under this act or seek a remedy
against such other. . . ." Wash. Laws, 1911, c. 74, p. 348. In 1927 that portion reading
"occurring away from the plant of his employer" was deleted. Wash. Laws, 1927, c.
310, p. 816. Two years later a proviso was added: "That no action may be brought
against any employer or workman under this act . . . if at the time of the accident
such employer or such workman was in the course of any extrahazardous employment
under this act." REU. Rav. STAT. § 7675 [P.P.C. § 709-1].
Thus from 1911 to 1927 an employee injured at his employer's plant did not have a
cause of action against a negligent third party. The employee could take only under
the act. However, if during this period a workman who was away from the plant
of his employer was injured due to the negligence of one not in the same employ, the
workman had his choice of taking under the act or suing the tortfeasor. The 1927 dele-
tion made negligent third parties liable at the election of.the injured employee regard-
less of where the accident took place. The 1929 proviso immunized from tort liability
those employers and workmen who at the time of the accident were engaged in extra-
hazardous activity under the act.
This last proviso is the one with which the instant case is concerned. The decision-
that though P's injury was connected with D's extrahazardous operations, the connec-
tion was remote and not temporal-is perhaps inconsistent with the underlying purpose
of the act. The Washington court has repeatedly said that the purpose of workmen's
compensation is to place on every hazardous industry the burden arising out of injuries
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to its employees, regardless of the cause of injury. The act establishes an industrial
insurance program designed to insure both employers and employees engaged in extra-
hazardous employment. In Weiffenbach v. Seattle, 193 Wash. 528, 76 P. 2d 589 (1938),
the court said that the 1929 immunity proviso "must have been granted by the 1929
legislature as a reciprocal compensation to industry for the burden it assumes as an
aggregate unit in providing, in the language of the statute... 'sure and certain relief
for workmen, injured in extiahazardous work.' . . ." In the instant case D was a
contributor to the fund and was engaged in extrahazardous employment. Having as-
sumed the burden, it is submitted that D, as a matter of policy, should have received
the benefit, namely the protection afforded by the immunity proviso.
In the instant opinion the court relied heavily on Gephart v. Stout, 11 Wn. 2d, 184,
118 P. 2d 801 (1941), where it was said that the employer who seeks to bring himself
within the immunity proviso must meet two requirements: (1) he must be a con-
tributor to the fund; (2) at the time of the accident he must be engaged in some
extrahazardous employment. Admittedly, D met the first requirement, but it was denied
the protection of the immunity proviso since the connection between P's injury and
D's extrahazardous employment was remote and not temporal. It is submitted that the
word "temporal," if it means anything in this connotation, is ill-chosen. Substituting
Webster's definition, the court is saying the connection is remote and not "pertaining
to, or limited by, time." The opinion doesn't define or explain "temporal," but the use of
the term suggests that the application of the immunity proviso will be restricted to
cases where the negligent act and injury occurred simultaneously. It is probable that
the 1929 legislature did not intend to afford such limited protection to third party
employers who are bound by the act. If the immunity proviso is not to be restricted
in its application to cases where the negligence and injury occurred simultaneously,
the point in time where a third party will be protected is still in doubt.
Perhaps a better test, and one which would avoid the disturbing use of the word
temporal, is one based on ownership, possession and control. In most cases where
third party immunity has been allowed, all of these elements were in the defendant
But the instant case presents a unique factual situation. By selling the scrap iron to X,
a third party, and having had it removed from its plant, D had divorced itself from
ownership, possession, and control. Properly then, it should not be entitled to the
protection of the immunity proviso. Thus it is suggested that where there is owner-
ship, possession and control, the defendant will have immunity; where he has none of
these, he will not. Future cases falling between these two extremes will determine the
exact line of division.
ZICHAMI M. OswALn
Corporations-Rights of Preferred Stockholders Upon Dissolution. A corporation's
articles of incorporation provided: "In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or
winding up of the Corporation the holders of the preferred stock shall be entitled to
be paid in full the par value thereof, and all accrued unpaid dividends thereon [italics
added] before any sum shall be paid to or any assets distributed among the holders of
the common stock." During the corporation's existence, it had never declared a
dividend. Furthermore, there was no surplus on hand at date of dissolution. In an
attempt to determine the rights of the respective stockholders, the liquidating trustees
of the corporation obtained a declaratory judgment construing the words "accrued
unpaid dividends" to entitle the preferred stockholders to receive, in addition to the
par value of their stock, an amount equal to the total amount of dividends which would
have been paid on the stock had there been a dividend paid every year since date of
